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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)  
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP  
MEETING, FEBRUARY 11, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

REF: 10 GENEVA 175 (SFO-GVA-VIII-038)  
10 GENEVA 165 (SFO-GVA-VIII-029); 10 GENEVA 177 (SFO-GVA-VIII-177)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department  
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-040.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 11, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)3. (S) During the Memorandum of Understanding Working Group (MOUWG) meeting on February 11, Mr. Trout and General Orlov discussed issues addressed earlier in the day at the Expanded Ad Hoc meeting (Ref A) concerning conversion and elimination of individual SLBM launchers, conversion of heavy bombers, and transfer of Trident II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. With respect to issues in Part Two of the Protocol, Section I was reviewed and some brackets were resolved. However, during the discussion it became clear there was significant misunderstanding regarding use of the word "database." The U.S. side delivered Part Four of the

Annex on Inspection Activities dealing with site diagrams and had a quick discussion on the U.S. approach. End summary.

¶4. (S) Subject Summary: Follow Up on Conversion of Individual SLBM Launchers; Converted Heavy Bombers; UK Trident Missiles; Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; Part Two Issues; and Site Diagrams.

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FOLLOW UP ON CONVERSION OF INDIVIDUAL SLBM LAUNCHERS  
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¶5. (S) Orlov made a few points regarding the Expanded Ad Hoc meeting earlier in the day (Ref A). He mused that while he understood the military benefits of having multi-mission capable submarines that could launch both SLBMs and cruise missiles the requirements of the treaty would severely restrict the operations of these submarines. Trout pointed out that the U.S. decision to convert single launchers on SSBNs had to do with political reality. He compared it to the decision of the United States not to develop mobile ICBM systems in the early 1990s, and pointed out that political willpower, based on the desires of the people, often carries the most weight when making major decisions in the United

States. He stated there was a large coalition of Senators that did not want to see any ICBM bases closed. Mr. Colby added there was a desire by the U.S. Government not to make too severe a cut in any one leg of the nuclear triad. Trout argued that it was reasonable for the United States to look for the most inexpensive, convenient way to lower their number of deployed and non-deployed launchers, and conversion of single SSBN tubes accomplished exactly that. Additionally, he continued, the number of SSBNs would not likely change due to operational requirements and the U.S. view that a survivable submarine force is stabilizing.

¶6. (S) Orlov stated the Russian Federation faced similar military and political problems and concerns, although with regard to the military, this applied more to the Air Force.

¶7. (S) Trout added the concept of "detubing," or rendering individual SLBM launchers on SSBNs incapable of launching an SLBM, was not new and was presented as a concept during preliminary discussions concerning START-III as a way to reach the low delivery vehicle limits. Trout said the U.S. Government was not sure what the tubes would be converted to, but in his opinion it seemed unlikely they would be converted into cruise missile launchers.

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CONVERTED HEAVY BOMBERS  
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¶8. (S) Orlov stated the United States was unlikely to ever prove satisfactorily to him the conversion process of the B-1B produced a bomber incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. Nuclear heavy bombers are designed from the beginning to carry nuclear armaments, he said. The electronics and unique equipment needed for the nuclear mission are intrinsic to that class of bomber. Consequently, the argument the United States had made for several years only addressed the "capping" of the connectors at the location where they attach to the nuclear armament; all the

internal connections and equipment still remain. Orlov added that he often wondered how the Russian Federation would try to present its case for a converted heavy bomber should it decide to pursue that capability. He often wondered if the Russian Federation would have any more success in convincing the U.S. side than the U.S. side had with its arguments. This, despite years of discussion in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), he commented.

¶9. (S) Trout pointed out it was difficult for the other side to fully understand a foreign technical system. Trout noted that one of the provisions in the agreed statement on B-1Bs included a continuation of periodic viewing of B-1Bs to instill confidence that the U.S. side was not circumventing treaty requirements.

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UK TRIDENT MISSILES  
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¶10. (S) Orlov asked about the U.S. practice of transferring Trident II missiles to the United Kingdom (UK) in reference to the Russian-proposed agreed statement on the subject. Trout pointed out that most of the provisions contained in the proposed agreed statement were already covered by other sections of the treaty. He noted that notifications existed for the transfer and return of missiles to and from a third party. Additionally, he pointed out, the Russian Federation will receive unique identifiers for each of the missiles transferred to the UK, which was more information than was disclosed under START. Trout acknowledged that the proposal to send a notification of a UK flight test was not covered under START nor had it been included as part of this treaty but argued that this was the flight test of a missile owned by a third country. He said the United States had no legal responsibility for such a notification. Trout said he assumed the UK would send a notice to mariners and airmen prior to any flight test.

¶11. (S) Orlov complained that Russia did not have an agreement with the UK to provide a notification when the UK performed a flight test. Trout responded that perhaps Russia should consider establishing an agreement to do just that. Orlov observed it was a political issue. He noted that he could not answer a simple question that was raised by his politicians: "Wouldn't the United States just continue to transfer missiles to the UK and have the UK perform flight tests for the United States?" Trout reiterated his point that the United States had no legal method to control a Trident II once it had been transferred to the UK. Orlov said he understood the legal position, but unlike the Russian Federation selling an anti-tank missile to another country, the United States was selling and transferring strategic offensive arms, which was another matter entirely.

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NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS  
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¶12. (S) Orlov asked whether the U.S. side had finalized its position on the status of bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. Trout replied the U.S. delegation was still discussing the issue.

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## PART TWO ISSUES

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¶13. (S) Trout delivered the U.S.-proposed joint draft text of Section I, General Provisions, that incorporated decisions from the previous meeting (Ref B).

¶14. (S) In paragraph 1, the sides debated the term "database." Mr. Pischulov argued that "database" referred to the categories of data, while Trout argued that it referred to this Part of the protocol. With help from the interpreters, both sides attempted to understand the rationale behind the other side's position. The interpreters realized that the Russian side was translating the word "database" as "initial data," similar to the way it was translated in START. With this realization, both sides noted a significant difference in the text. The U.S. side believed that Section I contained provisions that would apply throughout the life of the treaty and others that only applied to the initial exchange of data. Both sides agreed to consult with their lawyers and members of the Conforming Group.

¶15. (S) Pischulov agreed to delete Russian-proposed text in paragraph 2, subparagraph (d), leaving the subparagraph unbracketed.

¶16. (S) Trout informed the Russian side that the United States was dropping the bracketed text "warheads on deployed ICBMs" in Section III under the basing area for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

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## SITE DIAGRAMS, FINALLY

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¶17. (S) Trout delivered the U.S.-proposed joint draft text for Part Four of the Annex on Inspection Activities, Site Diagrams. He noted the United States had tried to bracket the text based on documents exchanged in November but that it was likely positions had changed somewhat since then.

¶18. (S) Trout turned to paragraph 2, subparagraph (b)(i) which listed the requirement that SSBNs and SSGNs be shown on the coastlines and waters diagram. This related to a discussion on SSGN inspections at submarine bases that took place during the Agreed Statements meeting (Ref C) earlier in the day. Trout noted the U.S.-proposed text required U.S. SSGNs within five kilometers of the center of the coastline of a submarine base be included on the coastlines and waters diagram provided to the Russian inspection team during a Type-1 inspection.

¶19. (S) Orlov drew several pictures of site diagrams to clarify the U.S. position on coastlines and waters diagrams. LT Lobner pointed out that all SSBNs and SSGNs that were located within the 5-kilometer radius would be shown on the diagram. When probed about submarines being located at different piers, Lobner noted it was U.S. practice generally to locate SSBNs and SSGNs at the same pier should an SSGN be at a submarine base. After the third drawing, Orlov stated that he believed he understood the U.S. position and would attempt to explain it to his colleagues.

¶20. (S) Trout called specific attention to paragraph 5 that dealt with changes to boundaries of diagrams. Trout noted that this idea, which was from START and which was formerly located in Section I, General Provisions, required that there must be agreement within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) in order to change a boundary for a diagram. Orlov brought up the point that the BCC would not always agree. Trout acknowledged the point admitting that some changes to diagrams were never approved in the JCIC under START, but noted that a majority of changes were agreed upon and approved. Orlov stated he personally understood why this provision was important and needed but stated it could be more difficult to convince his colleagues.

¶21. (S) Trout and Orlov agreed to discuss the issue of the translation difference for "database" during the next meeting.

¶22. (S) Documents provided:

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text, Part Two, Section I dated February 11, 2009; and

-- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text, Part Four of the Annex on Inspection Activities, Site Diagrams, dated February 11, 2009.

¶23. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Trout

Mr. Colby

LT Lobner (RO)

Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen. Orlov

Mr. Pischulov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
KING